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Abstract
The 1990s have witnessed enormous advances in the methods for decompos-
ing wages into the person and the ¯rm component. Typically, the main source
of identi¯cation is due to individuals moving from one employer to another em-
ployer { job mobility. The aim of this paper is to investigate the sensitivity
of these methods to two fundamentally distinct types of job mobility, job-to-
job transitions (JTJ) and job-unemployment-job transitions (JUJ). In a matched
employer-employee dataset covering a 25 % sample of all males employed in the
private sector in the period from 1990 to 1997 in Austria, we ¯nd that the ¯rms'
wage policy is more strongly correlated with the wage rate in the JUJ sample
than in the JTJ sample. Moreover, in contrast to the previous literature, we ¯nd
that industry wage di®erentials re°ect di®erences in wage policies rather than
unobserved skills. This ¯nding holds strongest for the e®ects identi¯ed using
JUJ transitions.
JEL-Classi¯cation: C23, J31
Keywords: Job mobility, Industry wage di®erentials, Matched employer em-
ployee data1 INTRODUCTION 2
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to investigate the sensitivity of the recently developed
methods of decomposing wages into a person and a ¯rm component to job mo-
bility.1 Intuitively, the change of a worker from one employer to a di®erent
employer is the main source of variation which one needs to separate person
and ¯rm e®ects. The main identifying assumption is that job mobility is ex-
ogenous. It is useful to distinguish between at least two fundamentally distinct
types of job mobility in order to study the degree to which endogenous mobility
a®ects the wage decomposition: job-to-job (JTJ) transitions on the one hand
and job-unemployment-job (JUJ) transitions on the other hand. Workers chang-
ing directly from one employer to another employer are likely to do so because
the new employer o®ers a superior remuneration package. This means that the
employment contract of the job held with the ¯rm prior to the job change is
likely to a®ect the new employment contract. In contrast, workers who enter
unemployment between jobs are more likely to have been laid o® by the previous
employer. Thus, pre-displacement job attributes are likely to be less important
for job-unemployment-job transitions than for job-to-job transitions.
In order to illustrate the consequences of endogenous mobility for the decom-
position of wages we provide results that allow assessing to what extent industry
wage di®erences re°ect di®erences in wage policies as opposed to di®erences in
worker characteristics across ¯rms. A long literature has documented persistent,
large wage di®erences across industries (Murphy and Topel (1987), Krueger and
Summers (1987), Krueger and Summers (1988) or Gibbons and Katz (1992)).
Various studies have shown that these are stable over time and countries.2 The
existing literature has o®ered numerous competing lines of explanations for per-
sistent di®erences in wages across industries. It is useful to classify the literature
with respect to the side of the labor market at which industry di®erences are
thought to originate. On the one hand, standard human capital theory combined
with informational asymmetries rationalize industry wage di®erences originating
from non-random sorting of workers with di®erent skills or abilities across in-
1See Abowd et al. (1999b) and Abowd et al. (2002a) for a discussion of statistical methods to
decompose wages into person and ¯rm components. Abowd and Kramarz (1999) give a review
of the literature using matched employer employee data.
2see for example Carruth et al. (1999) for the UK, Goux and Maurin (1999) for France, Vain-
iomki and Laaksonen (1995) for Finnland or Winter-Ebmer (1994) for Austria. Zweimueller and
Barth (1994) compare six countries with and without strong in°uences of unions and conclude
that unionism has an impact on the size of the di®erential. Kahn (1998) compares the stan-
dard deviations of log industry wage e®ects while controlling for collective bargaining and ¯nds
that industry wage di®erentials are smaller in continental Europe than in the United States.
Furthermore he concluded that "if the ongoing decentralization of wage setting institutions in
European countries continues, my results imply an increase in industry wage di®erentials" (p.
527).1 INTRODUCTION 3
dustries.3 On the other hand, a basket of theories explain why industry wage
di®erentials might exist even if workers were identical. These ¯rm based stories
comprise e±ciency wage theories (Krueger and Summers (1987)), bargaining and
union hypotheses (Booth (1995)), but also the theory of equalizing di®erences
(Rosen (1986)). Abowd et al. (1999) pioneered a graphical method to assess to
what extent observed di®erences in wages across industries might be due to the
worker's or the ¯rm's side of the market. The ¯ndings in that paper and Abowd
et al. (2002a) suggest that both sides of the labor market contribute to persistent
di®erences in wages.
In this paper, we use matched employer employee (MEE) data provided by
"Hauptverband der Ä Osterreichischen SozialversicherungstrÄ ager"4 and from "Ar-
beitsmarktservice Ä Osterreich"5 for the period between 1990 and 1997 to investi-
gate the extent to which job mobility a®ects worker and ¯rm components of the
wage rate. Besides our main sample which includes 2'179'485 observations for
399'804 persons, we construct two sub-samples. The JTJ sub-sample comprises
all persons who ever changed directly from one employer to another employer.
The JUJ sub-sample contains all person who ever lost their job and experienced
at least one day of unemployment before they found a new employer.6 The JTJ
sample contains 442'183 observations of 68'766 persons while the JUJ sample
covers 299'372 observations of 55'023 persons.
We then apply an iterative quasi-gradient algorithm in order to ¯nd the full
least squares solution to the model that decomposes wages into a person and a
¯rm e®ect. Findings indicate that, at the micro level, the ¯rm wage component
is more strongly correlated with the wage rate in the JUJ sample than in the JTJ
sample. Second, results suggest that industry wage di®erentials re°ect di®erences
in ¯rms' wage policies more strongly than di®erences in unobserved skills of in-
dividuals. This result holds strongest in the JUJ sample that is, arguably, the
least a®ected by endogenous mobility.
In the following section we describe the data, discuss the main variables,
and present a statistical analysis of the determinants of job mobility. Section
3 presents the statistical model, the estimation algorithm, and the de¯nition of
aggregate statistics based on ¯rm and worker components. Section 4 presents the
main results, and section 5 concludes.
3See Gibbons and Katz (1992) for a discussion of how information asymmetries, worker
heterogeneity combined with endogenous mobility can generate persistent industry wage di®er-
entials.
4Association of the Austrian Social Insurance Carrier
5Austrian Unemployment Register
6Workers who come back to their former employer after some days of unemployment, so
called recalls, are not treated as job changers.2 DATA 4
2 Data
The data used in the empirical analysis stems from two sources. The ¯rst and
main source are the Austrian Social Security Records, a very complete admin-
istrative database of matched employer-employee information collected by the
"Hauptverband der Ä Osterreichischen SozialversicherungstrÄ ager". This dataset
contains detailed information on the workers' employment and earnings history
between 1972 and 1998. For each individual, information on the number of days
worked at a particular ¯rm is available. Additionally sex and date of birth of each
individual, as well as location, industry and size of the ¯rms are known. The an-
nual earnings are reported with an upper bound of the determination base for the
social security system. Top-coding a®ects approximately 15% of all observations.
The second source of information is the Austrian Unemployment Register which
provides additional information such as education and nationality of all persons
unemployed at least once between 1986 and 1998.
2.1 Data selection
The particular data set used in this work contains a 25% sample of all males
employed in the private sector who worked on any October 10th between 1990
and 1997.7 We restrict the analysis to employees between 25 years and 55 years
due to two reasons. First, the data set does not provide information on working
hours. At 25 years of age, most individuals have completed their education and
are able to work full-time.8 Second, early retirement starts at age 60 (for males)
and 55 (for females). In order to rule out early retirement e®ects we focus on an
age group that is well below the early retirement age. Due to the administrative
character of the data we also know if a person is unemployed, ill, and we know if
a person has more than one job at the time. We focus only on those employees
who were working and evaluate the job with the highest earnings in the case
of multiple jobs.9 Using this selection criteria our data-set includes 2'179'485
observation of 399'804 di®erent persons and 124'906 ¯rms.
The focus of our analysis is on two subsamples which we use to analyze the
e®ect of endogenous mobility on wage decompositions. These two sub-samples
are constructed as follows:
The JTJ sample contains all individuals who changed their job at least once
but never through unemployment. A job change occurs if the employer in one
year is di®erent from the employer in the preceding year.10 Our assumption
7This is not a 25% sample of all observations but a 25% sample of all individuals ever worked
on October 10
th between 1990 and 1997.
8Referring to the data of Statistik Austria only 2.36 % of all male employees with an age
between 25 and 54 but 25.0 % of all employed women worked as part-time worker in 1994.
9Multiple job holders make up less than 1 % of the dataset.
10This classi¯cation means that if an employee changed within a year away from his old2 DATA 5
is that those who changed directly, did this because of an better remuneration
package in the new job. Thus the selection of the new employer would be an
endogenous decision. Comparing the wage in the new job with the wage in the
old job will not reveal the ¯rm wage di®erential that applies to an exogenous
move. The JTJ sample is mainly drawn for reasons of comparison. It contains
442'183 observations of 68'766 di®erent individuals and 54'674 ¯rms.
Table 1: Groups and Identi¯able E®ects
not Largest 2
nd Largest Average of all Total of all
connected Group Group other Groups Groups
main sample
Observations 89'002 1'956'062 191 11.70 2'090'483
Persons 21'560 352'716 30 2.22 378'244
Firms 21'560 83'535 4 1.73 103'346
Groups 1 1 11'475 11'477
Identi¯able E®ects 436'250 33 470'113
JTJ sample
Observations 283 365'706 248 8.61 441'900
Persons 88 56'251 33 1.40 68'678
Firms 88 33'441 7 2.40 54'586
Groups 1 1 8'822 8'824
Identi¯able E®ects 89'691 39 114'440
JUJ sample
Observations 62 271'527 66 6.01 299'310
Persons 32 49'538 9 1.18 54'991
Firms 32 40'886 2 2.33 51'630
Groups 1 1 4'613 4'615
Identi¯able E®ects 90'423 10 102'006
source: Authors' calculation based on data from Hauptverband der Ä Osterreichischen
SozialversicherungstrÄ ager.
note: In this table all 1 Person - 1 Firm Groups are eliminated, because there no e®ect is
identi¯able. Thus the numbers of observation, persons and ¯rms are di®erent from the results
in table (2).
The JUJ sample contains all individuals who changed jobs at least once and
always experienced at least one day of unemployment between successive jobs.11
Relative to the JTJ sample, job mobility in the JUJ sample is less likely to be
endogenous in the sense that the choice of the new employer is not driven by a
employer and than back again, this would not count as a job change. Also so called recalls do
not count as job changes.
11Individuals who changed directly at least once and indirectly at least once again are excluded
and do not show up in any sub-sample.2 DATA 6
better wage compared to the former job. Thus comparing the new wage with the
old one should reveal the true ¯rm wage di®erential. The JUJ sample contains
299'372 observations of 55'023 di®erent individuals and 51'662 di®erent ¯rms.
While by construction no individual shows up in both samples, 21'381 ¯rms
are in the JTJ sample as well as in the JUJ sample.
In order to identify one person and two ¯rm e®ects (see section 4.2 for the
de¯nition of these e®ects) we need connected groups of ¯rms and workers with at
least two di®erent persons or ¯rms. Thus for the econometric analysis we drop
those persons and those ¯rms which are not connected with any other person or
¯rm. This reduces the number of observations used in the wage decomposition in
all samples slightly, for instance from 2'179'485 to 2'090'483 in the main sample.
Table 1 shows the number of connected groups as well as the size of these groups
by sample. In order to establish connected groups we rely on the algorithm dis-
cussed in Abowd et al. (2002a). In every sample the vas majority of observations,
persons, and ¯rms is connected within one big group.
2.2 Construction of Main Variables
This sub-section describes the main variables used in the following empirical
analysis. We concentrate on those variables which needed to be constructed.
The wage information is measured as annual earnings including a possible
13th or 14th wage for each employee-employer combination. Because of the known
daily employment history we can construct a income per day worked, the 'daily
wage'. For a proper use of this variable we de°ate the wage and calculate the
natural logarithm. For those observations where the wage is reported at the
upper bound of the determination base we need to apply an approximation. In
order to address the top-coding problem, we construct a cluster of 1'440 cells12
based on age, experience, working place, blue collar or white collar and year and
estimate a tobit regression for each cell with log wage as the dependent variable
and a constant as the only regressor. This estimation yields the moments of
the censored normal variable that ¯ts the wage distribution best within each
cell. With this information in hand, it is possible to replace the censored wage
informations with their expectation in the absence of censoring. Because the ¯xed
e®ects method is a regression on the mean, this approximation is an appropriate
method to impute these wages.
Because of the known working history we can calculate labor force experience
and job tenure as the years actually worked instead of using potential labor force
experience. For persons who started their career before 1972 (29.41% of all per-
sons in the sample already worked before 1972) these variables are left censored.
We address this problem by recoding work experience into eight di®erent cate-
12See ¯gure 4 in Appendix B for an illustration of the clustering.2 DATA 7
gories (0, 1, 2-3, 4-5, 6-8, 9-12, 13-17, 18+ years of experience). Only the last
class includes persons whose work experience is a®ected by left censoring.
To control for the di®erent labor markets in Vienna and in big cities we in-
clude a geographic dummy variable for big cities if a city has more than 100.000
residents and another one for Vienna. The variable education captures the num-
ber of years necessary for a certain education level. It is only recorded if a person
has at least once been unemployed and registered at the Austrian Unemployment
Register which is available after 1986. This information is available for roughly
half of the sample. We construct a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the ed-
ucation information is available, and 0 otherwise. Thereafter we replace missing
information in the education variable with 0. This procedure is useful because
we do not have to restrict the sample to those individuals with non-missing in-
formation. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that the education
e®ect is identi¯ed using variation due to the sub-sample of individuals who ever
contacted the regional employment service o±ce in the period between 1986 until
1998. Some descriptive statistics are provided in table 2.
Comparing the JTJ sample and the JUJ sample in table 2, we note that the
average worker in the JTJ sample earns a higher wage than the average worker in
the JUJ sample, which supports our assumption that a job-to-job change might
be driven by a higher wage o®er. Further a person in the JTJ sample has a
higher education, more experience and tenure that individuals in the JUJ sample.
Because of the lacking information on education for those who have never been
unemployed between 1990 and 1997 the number of observations is much lower for
this variable.13 Additionally the JTJ worker is less likely to hold a blue collar
position, works with a higher probability in Vienna and his ¯rm has more workers.
Because the tenure is job speci¯c the average tenure must be lower than in the
main sample, where fewer job changes occur. These descriptive statistics show
that those who were never unemployed have better observable characteristics on
average and therefore they earn higher wages.
2.3 Determinants of Job Mobility
In this section we assess the determinants of JTJ transitions compared to JUJ
transitions. For this reason we present a multinomial logit analysis of the deter-
minants of job mobility.
Table 3 reports the results from a multinomial logit analysis. The dependent
variable equals 0 if there is no job change (base category), 1 if the individual
moves from one employer to the next employer without entering unemployment
(column JTJ), and 2 if a person changes employers with at least one day in
13Note that also in the JUJ sample there is a tiny subset of workers with missing education
information. These workers are classi¯ed as unemployed in the main data source but never
showed up at the employment service.2 DATA 8
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables
Industry Main Sample JTJ Sample JUJ Sample
Nobs Mean Nobs Mean Nobs Mean
SD SD SD
Log(Wage) 2'179'485 6.774 442'183 6.821 299'372 6.562
0.481 0.524 0.375
Education 1'012'228 9.956 148'021 10.237 296'238 9.874
1.718 1.972 1.573
Experience 2'179'485 13.468 442'183 13.172 299'372 11.661
5.332 5.415 5.587
Age 2'179'485 37.869 442'183 36.976 299'372 35.958
8.666 8.126 7.730
Tenure 2'179'485 6.212 442'183 4.195 299'372 2.196
6.815 5.401 3.526
Working in Vienna 2'179'485 0.223 442'183 0.259 299'372 0.222
0.416 0.438 0.416
Blue Collar 2'179'485 0.560 442'183 0.466 299'372 0.762
0.496 0.499 0.426
Firmsize 2'179'485 974.238 442'183 790.336 299'372 493.680
3'219.259 3'026.124 2'385.812
Number of person 399'804 68'766 55'023
Number of ¯rms 124'906 54'674 51'662
source: Authors' calculation based on data from Hauptverband der Ä Osterreichischen
SozialversicherungstrÄ ager.
note: All samples include male employed between 1990 and 1997; JTJ sample includes all male
employed between 1990 and 1997, except those who at least once experienced unemployment
between two jobs: JUJ sample includes all male employed between 1990 and 1997, except
those who at least once changed their job directly.
unemployment (column JUJ). The focus of this analysis is to assess whether
job mobility patterns di®er across industries. The estimated industry e®ects
(reference category is "Retail Trade") suggest that, at the qualitative level, job
mobility patterns do not di®er strongly across industries. In 4 out of 39 cases the
estimated coe±cients are signi¯cantly di®erent with opposite sign. For instance,
individuals in the "Food, Drink, & Tobacco" industry are more likely to change
directly from the previous employer to the new employer than in "Retail Trade".
The opposite is true for JUJ transitions. The same pattern emerges for the
industries "Cloth", "Leather", and "Road Tra±c". The estimated coe±cients in
the remaining 35 industries are either of the same sign or of opposite sign but
not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. Focusing on the magnitude of the estimated
coe±cient, a set of about 7 industries can be distinguished with a di®erence
between the e®ect in the JTJ and the JUJ transition equation exceeding .2 which
is a rather substantial di®erence. For instance, in "Education & Research" JUJ2 DATA 9
transitions are much less likely than in "Retail Trade", whereas JUJ transitions
are only slightly less likely than in "Retail Trade".
Table 3: Probability of a Job Change
JTJ JUJ
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Table 3: (continued)
JTJ JUJ
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source: Authors' calculation based on data from Hauptverband der Ä Osterreichischen
SozialversicherungstrÄ ager.
note: This table presents the results of a multinomial logit. The dependent variable equals 0 if
the person does not change her job. JTJ represents those who changed directly, while JUJ
represents those who changed through unemployment. The sample include male employed
between 1990 and 1997.
** Signi¯cant at 1% level, * Signi¯cant on 5% level
With respect to other individual level characteristics, we ¯nd that education
increases the probability of a job change without unemployment. The dummy
variable "No Education Info" refers to individuals with no education information.
Since we have education information for almost all individuals with at least one
JUJ transition, this dummy variable is not identi¯ed in the JUJ equation. In the
JTJ equation, we note that "No Education Info" tends to be associated with a
higher probability of a job change compared to the baseline outcome of staying
with the employer. Furthermore increasing experience and age are associated
with reduced likelihood of a job change. Individuals with at most 3 years of
tenure are very likely to change jobs directly. Even if the tenure is between 3 and
10 years there is a positive likelihood of a direct job change compared to those
with more than 10 years of tenure. With respect to JUJ transitions, we can see
that persons, who recently started a new job, are more likely to change through
unemployment while this probability decreases with higher tenure. Persons who
were unemployed at least once before the current period are less likely to change
the job at all. Individuals with higher wages change jobs less frequently than3 STATISTICAL MODEL AND METHODS 11
those with lower wages. High wages reduce the probability of a JUJ transition
more strongly than that of JTJ transition. Persons working in Vienna or in
a big city have a high probability of a job change compared to those living in
smaller municipalities, even if the likelihood of a change through unemployment
is smaller. The reason might be a bigger labor market which provides more jobs.
Blue collar worker change their job less likely directly than their white collar
colleagues but change with a higher probability through unemployment.
3 Statistical Model and Methods
This section discusses the statistical model that we use to decompose wages into
person and ¯rm components, the iterative quasi-gradient algorithm used to esti-
mate these e®ects, and the aggregation of person and ¯rm e®ects to the industry
level.
3.1 The Statistical Model
Let yit be the log of the wage rate of worker i at time t, let xit denote the time-
varying characteristics (labor market experience), let sit denote years of seniority
of worker i at time t, and let J(i;t) be the employer identi¯cation number of
worker i at time t. The number of workers in the dataset is N; the number of
¯rms is J, and the number of observations is N¤. We assume that
yit = xit¯ + µi + ÁJ(i;t) + °J(i;t)sit + ²it (1)
and
E[²itji;t;J(i;t);xit] = 0 (2)
The wage policy of the ¯rm is captured with two parameters. The entry wage,
Áj; captures the wage di®erential earned in the present ¯rm compared to the av-
erage ¯rm in the dataset (j = 1;:::;J). The tenure e®ect, °j; captures di®erences
across ¯rms in the wage increases due to changes in seniority (j = 1;:::;J). The
worker's wage component, µi, re°ects di®erences in pay due to unobserved or
observed time-constant characteristics of each worker (i = 1;:::;N).
The main statistical assumption is that of exogenous mobility in equation
(2). This assumption rules out any correlation between unmeasured time-varying
e®ects on the wage rate captured by ²it with person or ¯rm e®ects. The aim of
this paper is to assess the sensitivity of the estimated e®ects to the assumption of
exogenous mobility. Arguably, the assumption of exogenous job mobility is valid
to a di®erent extent in the JTJ sample compared to the JUJ sample. While the3 STATISTICAL MODEL AND METHODS 12
JUJ sample comprises primarily individuals who were laid o® by their previous
employer or who did not have enough time to search for a new employer while
still on the job, the JTJ sample contains individuals who moved directly from
the previous employer to the new employer. Thus, in the JTJ sample, there are
more grounds to believe that the exogenous mobility assumption is violated than
in the JUJ sample.
In matrix notation equation (1) is written as follows:
y = X¯ + Dµ + FÁ + S° + ² (3)
with D as a N¤ £N matrix of indicator variables for the persons, F as a N¤ £J
matrix of indicator variables for the ¯rm e®ects, and S as N¤ £ J the matrix
containing years of seniority.
3.2 Estimation Method




X0X X0D X0F X0S
D0X D0D D0F D0S
F0X F0D F0F F0S
























It is not possible to invert the cross-product matrix due to the large number
of person and ¯rm e®ects and due to computer memory constraints. In this paper
we apply an iterative quasi-gradient method to ¯nd the solution to the normal
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These are four blocks of normal equations that yield the required least squares
solution given the least squares solution of the remaining three sets of parameters.
It is possible to construct an iteration protocol based on (5). Choose starting
values ¯0;µ0;Á0; and °0. Let l index iterations. Solve for ¯l;µl;Ál; and °l using
(5) based on the estimate of the other parameters in iteration l ¡ 1: This gives
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Intuitively, the current estimate of ¯; for instance, is found by regressing the
residuals y ¡ Dµl¡1 ¡ FÁl¡1 ¡ S°l¡1 on the matrix X.
The algorithm is partially recursive in using the fact that the current value of
¯; ¯l; can already be used in estimating µl. In estimating Ál; the current values of
¯l and µl are used to form the residuals, etc. The algorithm converges to the true
least squares solution because parameter updates are chosen to ful¯ll the normal
equations given the values of the other parameters. We determine convergence
to be achieved when the absolute change in the sum of squared errors between
iteration l and l ¡ 1 falls below 1 ¢ 10¡11.
After the least squares solution b ¯; b µ; b Á; and b ° is obtained, we apply the group-
ing algorithm discussed in Abowd et al. (2002a) in order to establish the number
of identi¯ed e®ects. We normalize the person constant, the ¯rm constant, and
¯rm tenure parameter to be relative to the mean value of this parameter within
each group. Table 1 provides a summary of the results of the grouping procedure.
The person e®ect µi can be decomposed in a component due to the observ-
able personal characteristics (ui; education, age in 1990) and a person-speci¯c
intercept (®i):
µi = ®i + ui´ (7)
We apply this procedure separately, to the main dataset, to the JTJ dataset,
and to the JUJ dataset. Thus, we end up with three sets of parameters which
we index by the dataset in which they were obtained. For instance, b ¯M; b µM; b ÁM;
and b °M are the estimates from the main (M) sample.
3.3 Endogenous Mobility and Industry E®ects
Much of the literature has focused on the question whether the raw industry
e®ects ·¤¤ (obtained in a cross section regression of y on X and a set of industry
indicators) re°ect di®erences in the average wage policy of ¯rms across industries
or whether they re°ect di®erences in unobserved skills across industries. The raw
industry e®ects are de¯ned in the following regression
y = X¯ + FA· + º (8)
with
º = FÁ + S° + Dµ + ²
where the matrix A, J £ K, sorts each ¯rm J into one of the K industries.
Standard regression algebra shows that the raw industry e®ect consists of
three components3 STATISTICAL MODEL AND METHODS 14











Equation (9) shows that ·¤¤ consists of an industry speci¯c ¯rm e®ect (·f),
an industry speci¯c person e®ect (·p) and an industry speci¯c endogenous mo-
bility (EM) component. Intuitively, the industry speci¯c ¯rm e®ect ·f captures
cross industry di®erences in ¯rms' wage policies in a hypothetical world without
di®erences in observable characteristics X.
The existing literature has postulated that the industry speci¯c endogenous
mobility component ·EM is zero. Then, in order to assess the relative importance
of ¯rm wage policies vs. di®erences in worker characteristics in explaining indus-
try wage di®erentials, it su±ces to plot b ·¤¤ against the estimates of the industry
speci¯c ¯rm wage component b ·f and to plot b ·¤¤ against the estimated industry
speci¯c person component b ·p.14
This paper departs from the literature in postulating di®erences in the degree
to which the assumption of exogenous mobility is valid in the three datasets we
study. Speci¯cally, we expect that endogenous mobility is more relevant in the
JTJ sample than in the JUJ sample.
Before analyzing this question we have to prove how comparable are ¯rms
and workers in the main sample to the ¯rms and workers in the JUJ sample
and the JTJ sample respectively. There are two reasons why the e®ects in the
di®erent samples may vary. While we are interested in the endogenous mobility
e®ect, a selectivity e®ect may disturb our results. This selectivity e®ect may
arise if the persons and the ¯rms in all three samples are not randomly drawn,
as it is the case in this study. To test how far selectivity of ¯rms and workers
in the to sub-samples is critical for our results we calculate the industry average
e®ects of both sub-samples identi¯ed in the main sample, b ·r
m(q), with r = f;p
and q = JUJ;JTJ. These additional sub-samples enclose the same persons and
¯rms as the JUJ sample and the JTJ sample respectively, but di®erent industry
average e®ects. Thus di®erences in the correlation of the industry speci¯c e®ects
and the raw industry e®ects in the main sample on the one hand and the same
correlation in the sub-sample based on the main e®ects re°ect the error due to
selectivity. In other words, without selectivity:
14It is also true that estimated industry speci¯c ¯rm and worker e®ects should add up to the
estimated raw industry di®erential. We ¯nd that this condition is satis¯ed in all three datasets.
Speci¯cally, the correlation coe±cient between the sum of the industry speci¯c ¯rm and worker
component with the raw industry di®erential exceeds 0.99 in all three datasets.4 RESULTS 15
½(b ·¤¤
m;b ·r
m) ¡ ½(b ·¤¤
m(q);b ·r
m(q)) = 0 (10)
To show how endogenous mobility a®ects the correlation of the raw industry
e®ect and the industry speci¯c e®ects we compare the sub-sample e®ects based
on the main sample with the e®ects obtained in the sub-samples. Due to the
construction of the JUJ sample the endogenous mobility is minimized. Thus we
can use estimates of this sample as a baseline. If endogenous mobility leads to
an overestimation of an industry speci¯c e®ect, then
¢½r
m(JUJ);JUJ = ½(b ·¤¤
m(JUJ);b ·r
m(JUJ)) ¡ ½(b ·¤¤
JUJ;b ·r
JUJ) > 0 (11)
On the other hand by construction of the JTJ sample we impose relative high
endogenous mobility. Thus we should observe the opposite e®ect comparing the
results of this sample with the e®ects of the JTJ sample based on the main e®ects.
4 Results
This section ¯rst discusses whether industry e®ects in Austria are relevant and
how these di®erentials compare to those found for the U.S. The section then
provides the results of the ¯xed e®ects regression described before and elaborate
on the correlation coe±cients for components of the log real wage. The section
closes with the results regarding the role of endogenous mobility in decomposing
wages into a worker and a ¯rm component.
4.1 Inter-Industry Wage Di®erentials in Austria
Based on the main sample we estimate the regression (8). The results are shown
in the ¯rst column of table 4. All estimated di®erentials are highly signi¯cant.
For example wages in the mining, metal, printing, building materials, or air tra±c
industry are higher than the average wage while they are lower in most service
sector industries. As control variables we include experience, age, tenure (and
the squared of these), education, year dummies and dummies for Vienna, big
cities and blue collar. The adjusted15 standard deviation of the industry wage
di®erential shows the overall variability of the industry e®ect. It is very similar
to the one reported in Krueger and Summers (1988).
In the second column we present the results of the 1979 estimation of Krueger
and Summers (1988). Because of the di®erent industry classi¯cations16 it is not
15Following Krueger and Summers (1988) we compute the adjusted standard deviation by








16Krueger and Summers (1988) use May CPS while in Austria Ä ONACE (The Austrian version
of the European industry classi¯cation) is used.4 RESULTS 16
possible to provide an exact comparison. Thus, we concentrate on the sub-set
of Krueger-Summer industries which we could match with the corresponding
industry in Austria (column 2 of table 4). The correlation between industry
di®erentials in Austria with those in the U.S. is remarkably strong (.532). This
suggests that not only are industry wage di®erentials as relevant in Austria as
in the U.S. in terms of wage dispersion but it is also true that, on average, high
wage industries in the U.S. are also high wage industries in Austria.4 RESULTS 17
Table 4: Estimation of the Inter-Industry Di®erentials
Main Sample Krueger & Summers 1979
Variable Coef. (SE) Variable Coef. (SE)
Energy 0.168 (0.005) Public Utilities 0.068 (0.028)
Water -0.012 (0.014)
Mining 0.216 (0.005) Mining 0.263 (0.031)
Food, Drink, & Tobacco 0.064 (0.004) Food 0.019 (0.026)
Tobacco -0.040 (0.156)
Cloth -0.019 (0.005) Textiles -0.034 (0.156)
Clothes -0.163 (0.006) Apparel -0.132 (0.030)
Leather -0.143 (0.007) Leather -0.233 (0.051)
Wood -0.031 (0.004) Lumber -0.35 (0.035)
Furniture -0.120 (0.036)
Music Instr. & Toys -0.002 (0.006) Instruments 0.137 (0.040)
Paper 0.176 (0.005) Paper 0.088 (0.033)
Printing 0.179 (0.005) Printing 0.039 (0.028)
Rubber & Chem. 0.136 (0.004) Rubber 0.023 (0.036)
Chemical 0.148 (0.029)
Building Materials 0.165 (0.004) Stone, Clay & Glass 0.052 (0.034)
Metals 0.148 (0.004) Primary Metals 0.114 (0.026)
Fabricated Metals 0.039 (0.026)
Machine 0.149 (0.004) Machinery, excl. Elec. 0.092 (0.022)
Electrical Machinery 0.045 (0.021)
Electrotechnics 0.188 (0.004)
Vehicles 0.037 (0.004) Transport Equipment 0.156 (0.021)
Constructions 0.113 (0.004) Constructions 0.137 (0.016)
Wholesale Trade -0.007 (0.004) Wholesale Trade -0.015 (0.020)
Retail Trade -0.087 (0.004) Eating & Drinking -0.125 (0.020)
Other Retail -0.093 (0.050)
Road Tra±c, Railway -0.028 (0.004) Railroad 0.120 (0.037)
Inland Navigation 0.097 (0.011)
Air Tra±c 0.208 (0.006)
Shipping 0.028 (0.005) Other Transport 0.120 (0.022)
Telecommunication -0.399 (0.006) Communications 0.064 (0.027)
Banking & Credit 0.109 (0.004) Banking -0.063 (0.031)
Insurance -0.012 (0.005) Insurance 0.022 (0.027)
Art & Entertainment 0.001 (0.005) Entertainment -0.078 (0.019)
Health -0.073 (0.005) Hospitals 0.063 (0.018)
Medical Services -0.039 (0.022)
Welfare Services -0.190 (0.032)
Education & Research -0.372 (0.005) Education Services -0.185 (0.019)
Accommodation -0.185 (0.004)
Agriculture & Fishing -0.224 (0.005)
Forest -0.030 (0.005)
Regional Corporation -0.180 (0.004)
Building Maintenance -0.144 (0.012)






source: Authors' calculation based on data from Hauptverband der Ä Osterreichischen
SozialversicherungstrÄ ager. Estimation for 1979 by Krueger and Summers (1988) (Table II)
note: The pooled regressions is based on the main sample. Other explanatory variables are education,
no education dummy, experience, age, tenure, tenure2, year dummies, Vienna dummy, big city dummy,
and blue collar dummy. Only those Industries (May CPS classi¯cation) are shown in the latter row
which are more or less comparable to the industry classi¯cation in Austria. The standard deviation is
the same as shown in Krueger and Summers (1988).4 RESULTS 18
4.2 Full Least Squares Results
Table 5 shows the results of the ¯xed e®ects regression on log wages using the
iterative procedure discussed in section 3.17
Table 5: Fixed E®ects Regression on Wages
Main Sample JTJ Sample JUJ Sample



































































Nobs 2'090'483 441'900 299'310
R
2 0.937 0.937 0.924
source: Authors' calculation based on data from Hauptverband der Ä Osterreichischen
SozialversicherungstrÄ ager.
note: For a description of the samples see note of table (1).
Standard Errors are calculated by the person ¯rst method.
All results are deviations from the sample mean.
** Signi¯cant at 1% level, * Signi¯cant on 5% level
We regress the log wage on experience as a level variable, seven time dummies,
dummies for Vienna, big cities and blue collar workers and a constant. Results
for the main sample show that there is a strong increase of the wage rate with
experience, the maximum of the experience pro¯le occurring after 9-12 years.
This pro¯le is estimated quite similarly in the JTJ sample. While the experience
pro¯le in the JUJ sample reaches the maximum also after 9-12 years, the increase
in wages due to labor market experience is only about half as strong (0.066 log
17Because it is not possible to invert the cross-product matrix as described in section 3, the
standard errors are calculated with the "Person First" method. (see Abowd et al. (1999b))4 RESULTS 19
points) compared to the JTJ (0.120 log points) or the main sample (0.130 log
points). The maximum of the experience pro¯le occurs rather early. This may
have to do with the fact that we use the actual number of days worked since
1972.18 Second, wages increase very strongly over the time period. The time
e®ect on wages is strongest in the JTJ sample and weakest in the JUJ sample.
Working in a city with more than 100'000 inhabitants in 199119 is associated with
slightly lower wages compared to working in cities or communities with less than
100'000 inhabitants. Blue collar workers earn less than white collar workers in
all three samples.
Table 6: Descriptives of the Components of the Log Real Wage
Main Sample JTJ Sample JUJ Sample
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Log(wage) 6.787 0.444 6.829 0.503 6.568 0.356
Indiv. char. (x
0¯) 0.000 0.062 -0.000 0.060 0.000 0.037
Person e®ect (µ) 0.000 0.392 0.000 0.442 -0.000 0.347
Unobs. PE (®) -0.010 0.377 -0.009 0.438 -0.014 0.346
Obs. PE (u
0´) 0.010 0.079 0.009 0.056 0.014 0.006
Firm e®ect (Ã) -0.002 0.287 -0.009 0.360 -0.005 0.335
Unobs.FE (Á) -0.000 0.278 0.000 0.373 0.000 0.343
Tenure (°
0s) -0.002 0.154 -0.009 0.202 -0.005 0.176
source: Authors' calculation based on data from Hauptverband der Ä Osterreichischen
SozialversicherungstrÄ ager.
note: For a description of the samples see note of table (1).
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics of components of the log real wage. As
described in section 3, we decompose these components into observable time vary-
ing personal characteristics (x0¯), into non-time varying personal heterogeneity
(µ) and into unobserved heterogeneity of ¯rms' wage policy. Di®erences in ¯rm
wage policies are measured as the sample average of ÃJ(i;t);it = ÁJ(i;t)+°J(i;t)sit ;
that is, the predicted wage premium in ¯rm j after sit years of seniority. The
non time-varying personal heterogeneity we decompose again into an unobserv-
able part (®i) and an observable part (u0
it´; education and age in 1990). In all
samples, the person e®ect and the ¯rm e®ect vary much more strongly than the
components of wages that are related to time-varying personal characteristics.
In the main sample and in the JTJ sample, person e®ects (SD=0.392 (main);
SD=0.442 (JTJ)) vary stronger than ¯rm e®ects (SD=0.287, (main); SD=0.360
(JTJ)). In the JUJ sample, however, the ¯rm e®ect (SD=0.335) seems to be
18For instance, for workers who are seasonally employed, the di®erence between actual and
potential experience can be large.
19We use the information of the 1991 census in Austria.4 RESULTS 20
about as important as the person e®ect (SD=0.347) in generating di®erences in
wage rates.
Table 7: Correlation between Components of the Log Real Wage
Variable lnwage (x
0¯) (µ) (®) (u






Person e®ect (µ) 0.724 0.305 1
Unobs. PE (®) 0.688 0.271 0.977 1
Obs. PE (u
0´) 0.245 0.192 0.217 0.003 1
Firm e®ect (Ã) 0.389 0.010 -0.293 -0.306 0.028 1
Unobs.FE (Á) 0.344 -0.025 -0.232 -0.243 0.026 0.852 1
Tenure (°





Person e®ect (µ) 0.618 0.145 1
Unobs. PE (®) 0.603 0.141 0.992 1
Obs. PE (u
0´) 0.157 0.037 0.131 0.001 1
Firm e®ect (Ã) 0.355 0.034 -0.388 0.122 0.008 1
Unobs.FE (Á) 0.305 0.023 -0.348 -0.006 0.018 0.849 1
Tenure (°





Person e®ect (µ) 0.488 0.234 1
Unobs. PE (®) 0.487 0.232 1 1
Obs. PE (u
0´) 0.111 0.112 0.114 0.097 1
Firm e®ect (Ã) 0.397 -0.039 -0.543 -0.543 -0.023 1
Unobs.FE (Á) 0.349 -0.063 -0.469 -0.470 -0.027 0.863 1
Tenure (°
0s) 0.074 0.050 -0.116 -0.117 0.010 0.217 -0.306 1
source: Authors' calculation based on data from Hauptverband der Ä Osterreichischen
SozialversicherungstrÄ ager.
note: For a description of the samples see note of table (1).
Table 7 shows the correlation matrix of the components of the log real wage.
The correlation structure appears to be rather similar to ¯ndings in Abowd et al.
(2002a). We compare to their results because, to our knowledge, this is the only
paper that is based on the full least squares solution. The correlation between
the log real wage and x0¯ (0.412) in the main sample is slightly higher than
the corresponding correlation in the Washington State sample (0.304) and much
higher than in France (0.141). The person e®ect is very strongly correlated with4 RESULTS 21
the log real wage (0.724). This ¯nding is also present in France (0.704) but to a
weaker degree for Washington State (0.511). We ¯nd a correlation between the
¯rm e®ect and the log real wage (0.389) that lies between the results for France
(0.201) and for Washington State (0.518). The correlation between the person
e®ect and the ¯rm e®ect in Austria (-0.293) is very similar to that in France (-
0.283) but more negative than the corresponding correlation in Washington State
(-0.025). Thus, results for the main sample appear to be in line with ¯ndings in
the literature.
With respect to the details of the wage policy of the ¯rm, we note that the
starting wage (Á) is negatively correlated (-0.221) with the seniority component
of the wage rate (°0s):
There are some interesting di®erences in the correlation structure in the JTJ
sample when compared to the JUJ sample. While there is a strong correlation
between person e®ects and the log real wage in the JTJ sample (0.618), the cor-
responding correlation is much weaker in the JUJ sample (0.488). Interestingly,
the ¯rms' wage policy is somewhat more strongly correlated with the wage rate in
the JUJ sample (0.397) than in the JTJ sample (0.355). The correlation between
the person e®ect and the ¯rm e®ect is more negative in the JUJ sample (-0.543)
than in the JTJ sample (-0.388). Thus, in the JUJ sample, ¯rms are more im-
portant in wage determination than in the JTJ sample. Also, individuals with
good unobserved skills tend to be observed in ¯rms with worse than average wage
policies.20 Comparing results with the main sample, we note that the correlation
structure in the JTJ sample is more in line with ¯ndings for the main sample
than the JUJ sample.
Another way to compare the e®ects of the three samples is to correlate them
across the samples (results are not shown). This exercise yields a very similar
correlation of the ¯rm e®ect of the JTJ and the JUJ sample with the ¯rm e®ect of
the main sample (0.639 (JTJ), 0.654 (JUJ)), while both e®ects are less strongly
correlated with each other (0.403).21 The correlation of the person e®ect in the
JTJ sample with the person e®ect in the main sample is very strong (0.799). The
corresponding correlation between the person e®ect in the JUJ sample and the
main sample is weaker (0.686).
4.3 Endogenous Mobility and the Meaning of Industry Wage
Di®erentials
In order to address the 'meaning' of industry wage di®erentials, we investigate
the correlation between the raw industry e®ect b ·¤¤ with the industry speci¯c
person e®ect b ·p and with the industry speci¯c ¯rm e®ect b ·f; respectively. We
20The issue of why high wage workers sort into low wage ¯rms is discussed in Abowd et al.
(2002b).
21This correlation is based on 21'381 ¯rms which are included in each of the samples.4 RESULTS 22
¯rst present two plots based on the main sample. In a second step, we assess the
relevance of endogenous mobility by providing two additional sets of plots, the
¯rst referring to the JTJ sample, the second referring to the JUJ sample. The
section closes with a discussion of which component of wages is more strongly
a®ected by endogenous mobility.
Figure 1(a) plots the raw industry e®ect b ·¤¤
k against the industry average
person e®ect b ·
p
k and (b) plots the raw industry e®ect b ·¤¤
k against the industry
average ¯rm e®ect b ·
f
k (the sub-script k indexes industries and runs from 1 to
39). Figure 1 reveals a striking result. The industry wage di®erentials from a
cross section are very closely related to the industry average wage policy of ¯rms
(½ = 0:906; plot b). Upon closer inspection, we ¯nd that all industries, except
"Agriculture", "Air Tra±c", and "Telecommunication" appear to lie on the 45o
line. In comparison, the correlation between the raw industry wage di®erentials
and the industry average quality of workers is much less strong (plot a). The
slope is steeper than in plot b and the correlation weaker (½ = 0:675). Also,
industries such as "education" are clear outliers. Individuals in education have
average unobserved job skills but the education sector is estimated to have a very
low raw industry di®erential.
The ¯nding that raw industry di®erentials re°ect primarily unobserved dif-
ferences in ¯rms' wage policies rather than the di®erences in unobserved skills of
workers across industries stands in contrast to the literature. However, note that
existing studies that investigated the correlation between raw industry di®eren-
tials with industry speci¯c person and ¯rm e®ects have relied either on conditional
estimation methods (Abowd et al. (1999b); Abowd et al. (1999a)) or did not ap-
ply the full statistical model discussed in section 3 (Goux and Maurin (1999)).
Abowd et al. (2002a) ¯nd that conditional estimation methods may not work
very well if the set of conditioning variables Z is limited.
Figure 2 reports the corresponding analysis based on the JUJ sample. Inter-
estingly, we ¯nd a very strong association between the raw industry e®ect22 and
the average person e®ect (½ = 0:812; plot a). Moreover, raw di®erentials appear
to re°ect even more tightly di®erences in ¯rm wage policy across industries than
in the main sample (½ = 0:931; plot b). Thus, using a sample that is less a®ected
by endogenous mobility than the main sample, one might conclude that industry
wage di®erentials re°ect primarily di®erences in ¯rm wage policies
Figure 3 reports the corresponding analysis based on the JTJ sample. The
association between raw industry e®ects and industry average person e®ects (plot
a) is tighter than in the main sample (½ = 0:735), but looser than in the JUJ
sample. Using the JTJ sample yields much weaker correlation of the raw industry
22These raw di®erentials are estimated within the JUJ sample and thus not comparable to
the one obtained from the main sample. The correlation between these raw industry e®ect and
the estimated raw industry e®ect is ½ = 0:9814 RESULTS 23
di®erential with the industry speci¯c ¯rm e®ect (½ = 0:807). Thus, using a sample
that is a®ected by endogenous mobility more strongly than the main sample, one
tends to conclude that industry wage di®erentials are due to di®erences in the
skills of workers and due to unobserved di®erences in ¯rms' wage policies to
the same extent. Note that in the JTJ sample there are outlier industries like
"Agriculture", "Accommodation", "Air Tra±c", and "Inland Navigation" which
are identi¯ed to be very close to the 45o line in the JUJ sample. Thus, the result
that industry wage di®erentials re°ect primarily di®erences in ¯rm wage policies
appears to be a robust ¯nding. Moreover, this ¯nding holds strongest when we
focus on a sub-sample where endogenous mobility appears to be less of a concern
than in the main or JTJ sample.
The second column of table (8) resumes the correlations from ¯gure (2) &
(3), while the correlations of the main sample are displayed at the bottom of the
¯rst column. The additional shown correlation between the ¯rm speci¯c and the
person speci¯c industry e®ect di®ers strongly between the JUJ sample on the
one hand and the main and the JTJ ample on the other hand. In the absence of
endogenous mobility it is shown that on the aggregate level the ¯rm speci¯c e®ect
and the person speci¯c e®ect are highly correlated (½JUJ(·f;·p) = 0:610), i.e.
high productive workers work in high paying ¯rms. This result is not observed
in the two other samples.(½main(·f;·p) = 0:311; (½JTJ(·f;·p) = 0:200))
Table 8: Selectivity & Endogenous Mobility: Correlation of the raw industry e®ect and
the industry speci¯c e®ects
based on based on Selectivity endogenous
main sample sub-sample mobility
JUJ
½(·;·
f) 0.902 0.931 0.004 -0.029
½(·;·
p) 0.837 0.812 -0.162 0.024
½(·
f;·
p) 0.518 0.610 -0.207 -0.092
JTJ
½(·;·
f) 0.833 0.807 0.073 0.025
½(·;·
p) 0.744 0.735 -0.069 0.009
½(·
f;·









source: Authors' calculation based on data from Hauptverband der Ä osterreichischen
SozialversicherungstrÄ ager.
note: For a description of the samples see note of table (1).
The third column shows the e®ect due to selectivity as described in section
3.3. We compare the correlations within the sub-samples with the correlations5 CONCLUSIONS 24
within the main sample. Unfortunately all di®erences except for the correlation
of the ¯rm speci¯c industry e®ect and the raw industry e®ect in the JUJ sample
are far away from zero. Thus we cannot neglect the importance of selectivity.
Nevertheless we can show how the results are in°uenced by endogenous mo-
bility. Therefore we compare the correlations within the sub-samples with the
correlations within the sub-samples based on the main sample. Both samples
include the same observations, thus selectivity does not play a role. Comparing
the correlation of the raw industry di®erential with the ¯rm speci¯c e®ect shows
that ¯rm wage policy is relevant in the JUJ sample (¢½
f
m(JUJ);JUJ = ¡0:029).
The opposite is true for the JTJ sample. Here the ¯rm e®ect is more relevant
in the main sample than in the JTJ sample (¢½
f
m(JTJ);JTJ = 0:025). Because
the JTJ sample is strongly a®ected by endogenous mobility and the JUJ sample
is hardly a®ected by endogenous mobility we can conclude that disregarding the
e®ect of endogenous mobility will underestimate the importance of the ¯rm wage
policy.
The inverse relation is revealed if one compares the correlation of the raw
industry di®erential with the person speci¯c e®ect. While there is a positive
di®erence in the JUJ sample (¢½
p
m(JUJ);JUJ = 0:024), the di®erence in the JTJ
sample is close to zero (¢½
f
m(JTJ);JTJ = 0:009). Thus neglecting endogenous mo-
bility leads to overestimate the impact of the unobservable person characteristics
on the industry wage di®erential.
Even if we cannot exclude the selectivity e®ect we point out that endogenous
mobility will lead to an underestimation of the importance of the ¯rm wage policy
on the one hand and an overestimation the unobservable person characteristics
in favor to the latter.
5 Conclusions
The existence and persistence of inter-industry wage di®erentials is well doc-
umented. However, there is a considerable and ongoing debate regarding the
nature of these wage di®erentials. The two main lines of explanation focus on
unobservable heterogeneity of workers on one hand or on di®erences across ¯rms
on the other hand (rent sharing or compensating wage di®erentials). Recent
advances in statistical modelling as well as availability of MEE data allow in-
vestigating the question whether industry wage di®erentials re°ect di®erences in
¯rm wage policies or worker skills across industries. Studies that perform such de-
tailed wage decompositions reach the conclusion that industry wage di®erentials
re°ect both, di®erences in unobserved skills as well as di®erent wage policies.
This paper investigates the sensitivity of the new statistical modelling tech-
niques to job mobility. Job mobility is the main requirement in separating person
e®ects from ¯rm e®ects. Arguably, transitions that occur directly from one em-5 CONCLUSIONS 25
ployer to the next employer (job-to-job; JTJ) are fundamentally di®erent from
transitions that involve a spell of unemployment between the previous and the
next employer (job-unemployment-job; JUJ).
Based on a MEE dataset for Austria, we obtain the full least squares solu-
tion to the statistical model that decomposes wages into a person and a ¯rm
component. Findings suggest that the ¯rms wage policy is more strongly cor-
related with the wage rate when identi¯ed in the JUJ sample than in the JTJ
sample. Second, industry wage di®erentials re°ect di®erences in ¯rm wage poli-
cies more strongly than di®erences in person characteristics. Third, it is shown
that endogenous mobility tends to lead to overrating the importance of person
di®erences in explaining industry wage di®erences.
Future work should address the determinants of the relative importance of
¯rm and worker e®ects in explaining industry e®ects in a cross country compari-
son on one hand. On the other hand, the relevance of di®erences in the amenities
or disseminates provided by jobs (such as safety hazards or unemployment risk)





















Industry Average Person Effect
     


































































Industry Average Firm Effect
     















































Figure 1: Correlation of the Raw Industry Di®erential with (a) Industry Average Person
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Figure 2: Correlation of the Raw Industry Di®erential with (a) Industry Average Person
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Figure 3: Correlation of the Raw Industry Di®erential with (a) Industry Average Person
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